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The international environment underwent a change during the summer, with a notable 
downturn in the prospects of recovery in the main economies and a heightening of the 
crisis in the euro area. This has ultimately affected the Latin American economies, which 
had to date largely remained on the sidelines of events on international markets.
In addition to the more immediate impact on financial asset prices, the change has been 
two-pronged. On one hand there has been a turnaround in economic prospects, reflected 
in the growth projections of several of the main economies in the region, which are begin-
ning to post downward revisions of some size for 2011 and 2012 (see Chart 1). On the 
other, the economic policy mix has begun to be re-balanced: monetary policy is adapting 
to a more uncertain environment, despite the fact that inflationary pressures have not so 
far shown clear signs of abating, while fiscal policy has not adopted a resolutely restrictive 
stance. In this respect, the upward cycle of official interest rates begun in 2010 has come 
to a halt, and the Brazilian central bank has eased its monetary policy stance.
National Accounts figures continued to show robust economic growth in the first half of 
2011 in Latin America as a whole, albeit lower than in 2010, when most countries managed 
to close the negative output gaps that arose during the crisis. The year-on-year growth rate 
eased from 5.5% in Q1 to 4.3% in Q2 owing to the impact of the slowdown in Brazil and 
Mexico (partly due to base effects) and an easing in domestic demand practically across 
the board. Country by country, developments were not fully homogeneous, since while in 
Brazil and in Mexico the weakness of the industrial sector was a conditioning factor 
(against the background of an appreciation in the exchange rate, in the first instance, and 
of the sluggishness of the US economy, in the latter case), in Argentina, Chile, Peru and 
Colombia growth remained much more robust. Inflation rose to a year-on-year rate of 7% 
in September for the region on average, somewhat up on the start of the year.
In this setting, the ongoing re-balancing of economic policies can be interpreted in several 
ways. Most immediately, in the face of the risk of a strong slowdown and even a global re-
cession, concern for the effects on activity in the region has come to the fore, relegating the 
possibility of an inflationary surge which, moreover, would be mitigated in the context of 
falling commodities prices. In this respect, monetary policy is conceivably adopting, at least 
in some countries, a pre-emptive approach (taking as its reference the experience in 2008), 
though not one exempt from risks to its credibility given the underlying inflationary pres-
sures. A second and not necessarily exclusive interpretation is that the prior economic poli-
cy mix – in particular the tightening of monetary policy – was sub-optimal, insofar as it was 
imposing excessive upward pressure on exchange rates owing to the interest rate spread 
and, at the same time, it was easing domestic monetary conditions via the massive inflow of 
short-term capital. A phase of greater risk aversion would thus contribute to mitigating these 
problems and the monetary policy dilemmas. If the first interpretation is correct, inflation 
should be contained over the coming months. The risk would lie, however, in the credibility 
of monetary policy being undermined were this containment not to come about.
In the short run, the downside risks have increased substantially. The intensification of risk 
aversion on financial markets in recent weeks, the perceived fragility of the developed 
countries’ banking systems, the fall in commodities prices to which Latin America is sensi-
tive, and the downturn in the world economic growth outlook augur less growth in Latin 
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America in the second half of 2011, suggesting that domestic demand will only partly off-
set the effect of the external shock. This would not necessarily be negative in all the coun-
tries, in light of overheating. Moreover, external positions have worsened in the present 
expansionary phase, making the region more vulnerable to the current economic situation. 
Conversely, the build-up in reserves and the perception of soundness following the 2008 
shock would mitigate this potential vulnerability. The countries of South America are today 
less dependent than in the past on growth in the United States and in the industrialised 
countries, and more so on Asia, where the slowdown is so far very limited. However, the 
deceleration could step up if the developed economies were to go into recession, given 
their high proportion of intermediate trade. Against this backdrop, and bearing in mind that 
the region’s economic policies appear to be adapting swiftly to the changing situation, 
growth might stand at a rate close to trend in the coming quarters in most of the countries, 
in the absence of greater instability in the euro area.
In recent months global economic and financial developments have been marked by the 
substantial worsening of tensions on international financial markets further to the height-
ening of the euro area sovereign debt crisis and the bleaker outlook for world – and espe-
cially US – economic growth.
In June and July financial tensions mounted in the euro area in the face of the inability to 
agree on a new aid programme for Greece and the discrepancies surrounding the partici-
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pation of private investors in the programme. The agreements reached at the European 
summit of Heads of State or Government on 21 July – which, along with the second bail-
out package for Greece, included more ambitious measures for reducing the risk of con-
tagion – did not manage to avoid a prolongation of the instability, which only began to 
abate from the second week in August, following the ECB Governing Council’s decision to 
reactivate its Securities Market Programme. In any event, this reversal proved transitory, 
since in September volatility levels once again rose in the face of uncertainty over the dis-
bursement of a fresh aid tranche for Greece and, ultimately, in light of the lack of a conclu-
sive solution to the European sovereign debt problem.
Economic activity slowed appreciably in Q2 (see Chart 2) in the developed economies and, 
according to the leading indicators, this is expected to have continued in Q3. In principle, 
this slowdown was associated with temporary factors, such as the interruption of produc-
tion chains in the wake of the earthquake in Japan or the prevalence of high commodities 
prices stemming, in part, from supply-side problems. Nonetheless, the notion that the lack 
of momentum of activity in the developed countries is due to structural fragilities has 
gradually gained currency. In this respect, the scant leeway available for fresh fiscal and 
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monetary stimuli and the need for private-sector deleveraging pose serious obstacles to 
recovery. Compounding these factors is the sharp downturn in agents’ confidence, which 
is bearing down on private consumption and investment. In any event, the central sce-
nario does not envisage another recession, but rather a slower-than-expected recovery 
and one not free from ups and downs. Along these lines, growth projections for the ad-
vanced economies have been revised downwards for 2011 and 2012, to below 2% as 
opposed to the 3.1% growth posted in 2010, and the balance of risks has shifted signifi-
cantly onto the downside. In a setting of growing concern over growth, and set against the 
scenario of the withdrawal of monetary and fiscal stimuli anticipated some months back, 
the markets are now discounting that official interest rates in the main economies will hold 
at very low levels for a prolonged period, and in recent weeks several central banks in 
advanced economies have extended the application of non-conventional measures. In the 
fiscal arena, despite the major challenges public finances face in the advanced economies 
(reflected in the downgrading of credit ratings not only in euro area countries but also in 
the United States and Japan), it has been put forward in recent months that those coun-
tries with fiscal headroom should delay the consolidation process, without renouncing the 
attainment of sustainable public finances in the medium and long run.
In Q2 the emerging economies continued to post rates of expansion that were high, al-
beit more moderate than in the preceding quarters. The slowdown is expected to advance 
gradually, aided by the withdrawal of monetary stimuli and by the slowing of the developed 
economies. The growth rate of the emerging countries is thus expected to stand between 
6% and 6.5% in 2011 and 2012, compared with 7.3% in 2010. However, a sharper slow-
down cannot be ruled out if the advanced economies go into recession. Of particular 
concern in this connection is the increasing risk of an abrupt slowdown in the Chinese 
economy, more for its potential effect on the world economy than for the likelihood of such 
an acute adjustment taking place.
Turning to prices, inflation in the developed economies remains at a moderate level, while 
inflationary pressures (along with other signs of overheating such as high credit growth or 
asset price developments) remain in place in some emerging economies. Notwithstanding, 
these economies have interrupted the cycle of official interest rate rises and certain central 
banks (such as Brazil and Turkey) have even made cuts in light of the severe weakening of 
the global environment. Against this background, the international financial markets wors-
ened considerably, as reflected in the widening of sovereign debt yield spreads in the euro 
area to all-time highs since the creation of the single currency. These tensions spread to 
other markets, particularly in Europe but also in other developed and emerging econo-
mies. Heavy corrections in stock market indices ensued, with a substantial increase in 
volatility (see Chart 2), higher credit risk premia on securities issued by the private sector 
and greater difficulties in obtaining funds on interbank markets, especially for European 
banks in the case of dollars. As a result, the raising of wholesale funding by credit institu-
tions became particularly complex.
The increase in international investors’ risk aversion prompted a search for safe-haven as-
sets, which took the form of heavy outflows from emerging stock markets (close to $18 
billion between August and September). Along with the downturn in growth prospects, this 
led to a decline in long-term debt yields in several developed economies, in particular in 
the United States and Germany, to historically low levels. The Japanese yen and the Swiss 
franc also acted as safe-haven assets in this period. Indeed, in the face of the strong up-
ward pressures on these currencies, both countries intervened on the foreign exchange 
markets and approved exceptional measures to check this appreciation. Brent oil prices 
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moved in a relatively narrow range (between $110 and $120 per barrel), even though po-
litical tensions in various Middle East countries remained unabated; however, in recent 
weeks oil prices have fallen below $105, against a backdrop of generalised falls in com-
modities prices and relatively sluggish demand.
Developments on Latin-American financial markets over the past six months can be divided 
into two phases. In the first, from April to end-July, the chain of global events with a potentially 
adverse impact mentioned in the previous section scarcely affected the region’s credit risk in-
dicators. Given the soundness of fundamentals, the markets attributed the emerging econo-
mies – Latin American countries among them – with a significant decoupling capacity in respect 
of the global economy’s problems. The sovereign spread, measured by the Latin America 
Global EMBI, held stable around 360 bp until end-July, in contrast with previous episodes of 
turbulence. Further, the stability of the aggregate spread was the consequence of the increase 
in the spreads in two of the countries considered riskiest, mainly Argentina and Venezuela, 
while in Colombia, Brazil and Peru spreads actually narrowed (by around 20 bp) (see Chart 3). 
Financial markets 
and external financing
SOURCES: Datastream and JP Morgan.
a MSCI Latin America Index in local currency.
b Standard & Poor's scale.
c Brazil stands throughout the period under study at BBB- and Chile at A+ according to the Standard & Poor's scale. Other agencies raised the rating of these 
countries during the period. 
d Aggregate of 11 countries weighted according to their weight in world GDP: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain.
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Default risk premia behaved similarly, meaning that in late July those for Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico stood far below the weighted average of the five countries most affected by the 
euro area crisis. This initial resilience of the Latin American economies was reflected in the 
upgrading of credit ratings or their outlook in four countries, Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Peru, 
and there was also a positive feedback effect from this phenomenon (see Chart 3).
All these developments proved conducive to maintaining capital inflows at close to their 
highs in the region. Direct investment in the period from July 2010 to June 2011 was $125 
billion, while portfolio investment stood at $97 billion, although there was a change in the 
composition of this latter variable, with inflows into debt and outflows from stock markets, 
which helps explain why stock market indices have held on a declining trend (see Chart 4). 
Bond issues on international markets continued apace, led by the Brazilian banking sector 
(18% of total issues in the region). This placed Brazil and Mexico as the biggest and third-
biggest issuers among the emerging economies in this period. Issues by companies in the 
region on international markets reached monthly highs in January and May 2011, driven by 
Brazil. Companies that had not previously resorted to these placements did so, although 
this characteristic is not exclusive to the region (see Box 1).
SOURCES: Dealogic, JP Morgan, IMF and national statistics.
a A positive sign denotes a current account de?cit.
b Difference between investment ?ows and the current account de?cit (-).
c WEO forecasts (September 2011) for 2011-2012.
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This box analyses emerging economies’ bond issues from a 
long-term perspective, highlighting some of the benefits and po-
tential risks of the strong increase seen in the past two years. 
Emerging economies’ issues totalled $219 billion in the first nine 
months of 2011, the second-biggest annual amount recorded. 
This figure is without the year having ended and despite the fact 
that, from September, global financial tensions have entailed a 
virtual freeze on such placements. The biggest issuers at present 
are the Latin American and Asian countries, with the issues of 
each of these regions accounting for around one-third of the total 
bonds issued by the emerging economies in 2011 to date (see 
Panel 1.1). In the past two years monthly issues were very high, 
even at times at which global risk was increasing (see Panel 1.2), 
and in some cases (the corporate sector in Mexico or the bank-
ing sector in Brazil) all-time highs were posted in the first half of 
the current year.
BOX 1EMERGING ECONOMIES’ ISSUES ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
SOURCES: Dealogic, Datastream and IIF. 
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In the past three years, the value of emerging countries’ issues 
was somewhat over $690 billion on international markets, which 
marks an annual average increase of over 73% compared with 
issues in the period 2003-2007. However, this increase has only 
been slightly higher than that of the advanced economies’ is-
sues, meaning that the weight of emerging countries’ place-
ments relative to total world issues has only risen from 9.3% in 
2003-2007 to 10.6% in 2009-2011. Panel 1.3 shows the increase 
in annual average issues between both periods, along with the 
ranking of the various countries among world issuers in the pe-
riod 2009-2011, while the size of the bubble represents the vol-
ume of issues placed in these three years. Significantly, some 
emerging economies have already taken on a major role as bond 
issuers on international markets. Brazil and China, previously 
ranked 20th and 40th among issuers (emerging and developed 
alike) in the period 2003-2007, have climbed to 15th and 24th 
position in the past three years.
Access by the emerging economies to international financial mar-
kets has clear advantages, such as the possibility of undertaking 
projects which, otherwise, would be limited by their thin domestic 
credit markets. But it also poses risks from the standpoint of finan-
cial stability.
An initial risk hinges on the nature of the issuer: if most of the is-
sues have been conducted by the public sector, they might in prin-
ciple pose fewer risks given their greater capacity to withstand 
debts or ease shocks affecting their ability to pay. Indeed, corpo-
rate bond spreads, measured by the CEMBI, have held above sov-
ereign spreads (by 35 bp on average in 2010 and 2011). Panel 1.4 
shows how the corporate sector is responsible for the increase in 
issues in recent years, accounting for almost 70% of the total, 
when at the start of the last decade they represented around 45%, 
which would entail to some extent a greater relative risk for hold-
ers of these assets at present compared with the sovereign alter-
native, although in both cases the spread has narrowed compared 
with the past. By region, Eastern Europe has taken up the baton 
from Latin America as the area in which the biggest volume of 
sovereign issues is concentrated, as a result of the volume issued 
by Russia and Poland (see Panel 1.5). By contrast, the strong in-
crease in corporate issues on international markets in the past 
three years has been due, above all, to Latin American companies 
(see Panel 1.6).
The second risk would be associated with the economic sector 
undertaking the corporate issues. Given that most of the issues 
on international markets are denominated in foreign currency, an 
increase in issues entails balance sheet mismatch risks similar to 
those experienced in recent emerging economy crises (which am-
plified the effects of exchange rate devaluations on activity), es-
pecially in those companies for which most earnings are in local 
currency, as is the case of the banking sector. If issues are con-
centrated in the real estate sector, the risks will be more on the 
side of the possible formation of bubbles and, if both sectors (real 
estate and banking alike) are closely connected, the risks will 
multiply. Conversely, if issues are concentrated in the export sec-
tor (e.g. primary-sector companies), exchange rate risk will be 
lower, as corporate revenue will be mainly in foreign currency. 
Panels 2.1 to 2.5 offer this breakdown, at aggregate level and by 
region. It can firstly be seen that the relative weight of the different 
sectors in total issues has held relatively constant, meaning that it 
is issues included under the heading “other corporates” (basically 
public utility industrial and services companies) that continue to 
account for most of the market, albeit with a growing weight of 
the banking sector. 
In Latin America it is primary-sector companies that have domi-
nated issues since the 2008 crisis, reflecting in part the changes 
in their productive specialisation and the strong increase in the 
sector’s profitability following the rise in commodities prices as 
from 2003 (see Panel 2.2). Nonetheless, a notable increase in is-
sues by banks in the region (specifically Brazilian banks) is also 
perceptible, and in 2011 to date they have already issued more 
than they raised in 2010 as a whole. The presence of real estate 
companies is also very limited in respect of issues in Latin Amer-
ica, though not so in Asia - and in particular in China - where 
these companies have issued around $20 billion in 2010 and 
2011, climbing from 0.1% of the region’s total issues to 17% in 
the past two years (see Panel 2.3).
Another significant feature of the emerging economies’ bond is-
sues on international markets is the growing use of local cur-
rency. If the issue is made in local currency, the risks to holders 
would arise from exchange-rate changes and from the possible 
loss of value of the assets due to inflation, while the borrower 
would be protected in respect of the first factor and would ben-
efit from the second. Traditionally, the emerging economies have 
been obliged to finance themselves in foreign currency (a conse-
quence of the so-called “original sin”1), but in recent years they 
have increased local-currency-denominated issues. As can be 
seen in Panel 2.4, local-currency issues peaked in 2010 and 
2011, although they continue to account for a minority share. 
This type of placement has increased mainly in Asia, and, thus, 
in the real-estate and non-financial corporate sectors, issues in 
local currency as a proportion of total issues have exceeded 
25% in the first nine months of 2011, climbing to more than 42% 
in the case of sovereign issues (12% and 25% in the years 2009 
to 2011). In the banking sector it is Eastern European - and, spe-
cifically, Russian - banks that have been most active in this seg-
ment, while in Latin America the biggest recent local-currency 
issues have been in other corporate sectors (more than 10% of 
the total).
BOX 1EMERGING ECONOMIES’ ISSUES ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS (cont’d)
1  The so-called “original sin” of the emerging economies refers to the im-
possibility of them raising funding on international markets in their own 
currency, and the only variable that is correlated to this impossibility is 
the size of the country. Thus, transaction costs, the externalities of using 
the vehicular currencies of international trade and the imperfections of 
capital markets would be the determinants of this problem, more so than 
the individual countries’ macroeconomic policies. See B. Eichengreen, 
R. Hausmann and U. Panizza (2003b), Currency Mismatches, Debt Intol-
erance, and Original Sin: Why They Are Not The Same and Why It Mat-
ters, NBER Working Paper, 10036.
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BOX 1EMERGING ECONOMIES’ ISSUES ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS (cont’d)
SOURCES: Dealogic, Datastream and IIF. 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
PRIMARY SECTOR BANK REAL ESTATE 
OTHER CORPORATES 
$bn
 
2.2 CORPORATE ISSUES BY TYPE OF COMPANY: LATIN AMERICA 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
PRIMARY SECTOR BANK 
REAL ESTATE OTHER CORPORATES 
$bn
% %
 
2.3 CORPORATE ISSUES BY TYPE OF COMPANY: ASIA 
0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
300 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
FOREIGN CURRENCY 
LOCAL CURRENCY 
$bn 
2.4 ISSUES ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: BY TYPE OF CURRENCY 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
180 
200 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
PRIMARY SECTOR BANK REAL ESTATE  
OTHER CORPORATES 
  
2.1 CORPORATE ISSUES BY TYPE OF COMPANY 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
Latin America Asia Eastern Europe Other 
  2003-2007   2009-2011   2003-2007   2009-2011 
2.5 SOVEREIGN ISSUES: PERCENTAGE OF ISSUES IN LOCAL CURRENCY 
  
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
B
an
k 
P
rim
.S
ec
to
r 
R
ea
l E
st
at
e 
O
th
er
 
B
an
k 
P
rim
.S
ec
to
r 
R
ea
l E
st
at
e 
O
th
er
 
B
an
k 
P
rim
.S
ec
to
r 
R
ea
l E
st
at
e 
O
th
er
 
B
an
k 
P
rim
.S
ec
to
r 
R
ea
l E
st
at
e 
O
th
er
 
2.6 CORPORATE ISSUES: PERCENTAGE OF ISSUES IN LOCAL CURRENCY 
Latin America Asia Eastern
Europe
 Other  
  
$bn
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 102 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2011 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2011
BOX 1EMERGING ECONOMIES’ ISSUES ON INTERNATIONAL MARKETS (cont’d)
Finally, the increase in placements may be due to new firms enter-
ing the market, on which there is less information regarding sol-
vency, or to companies whose presence on international markets 
is already consolidated. The years 2010 and 2011 have seen a rise 
in the number of companies in emerging economies - mainly in 
Asia, and particularly in China - that are gaining access for the first 
time to international markets. The increase in the number of issu-
ing companies has been accompanied by a decline in the average 
rating of the issues (see Panel 3.1), which still stands, however, at 
investment grade. The average maturity of the issues also de-
clined slightly as new firms entered the market, and the average 
spread charged rose, standing in both cases in a more unfavour-
able position than the previous high for the entry of new firms, in 
2006 (see Panel 3.2).
In sum, there has been a notable increase in emerging economies’ 
issues on international financial markets in the past three years. Un-
doubtedly, that has proven propitious for the financing of profitable 
projects which, in the absence of this channel, might not have been 
undertaken given the thinness of local markets. However, some of 
the characteristics of this process - the greater weight of corporate 
issues, of local-currency-denominated issues and of those issued by 
companies tapping the international markets for the first time - entail 
some increase in the risks for investors in these markets.
SOURCES: Dealogic, Datastream and IIF. 
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From April to July, capital inflows fuelled exchange-rate rises against the dollar which, 
along with the increase in inflation, increased the misalignment of real effective exchange 
rates, which stood in July at historical highs or close to them. To tackle capital inflows, 
countries had to resort once again to various macroprudential measures, such as foreign 
currency reserve requirements (Peru), capital controls (Brazil) or central bank intervention 
in the form of currency purchases.
In July, however, the picture changed substantially. As mentioned in the previous section, 
the heightening of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and the weaker growth out-
look, chiefly in the United States, triggered a severe worsening on international financial 
markets, characterised by a substantial increase in risk aversion. Against this backdrop, 
there was a notable decline in risk-bearing asset prices (among them emerging econo-
mies’ exchange rates, stock markets and bonds) given the perception that the emerging 
economies would hardly remain immune to a new global shock. The emerging debt mar-
kets – which had until then withstood the downturn in global conditions, with inflows of 
close to $2 billion and issues in August totalling more than $15 billion, including very long-
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term operations (a 100-year bond in Mexico) – were finally affected in mid-September by 
major capital outflows and the grinding to a halt of bond issues.
In this setting, financial indicators deteriorated across the board. From July stock mar-
kets fell by 18% in Latin America and sovereign spreads widened (the Latin America 
Global EMBI increased by 121 bp). The stock markets that most fell were Argentina 
(-30%), Peru (-17%) and Chile (-12%), while sovereign spreads increased particularly in 
Mexico (by 86 bp to 245 bp). Finally, there was a strong depreciation in exchange rates 
towards the end of September (see Chart 4), of more than 10% in Chile and close to 
15% in Mexico and Brazil. This was a similar depreciation to that in other major emerging 
currencies, such as the South African rand (-18%) or the Russian rouble (-14%), and 
may be largely explained by the cancellation of carry trade at a time of worsening ten-
sions which proved conducive to flows towards safe-haven assets. These developments 
led the Peruvian and Brazilian central banks to intervene selling reserves, while Colom-
bia altered its foreign exchange intervention arrangements, making purchases of re-
serves less automatic.
Growth remained robust in Latin America in the first half of 2011. Quarter-on-quarter rates 
of 1.4% and 1.1% were respectively posted in Q1 and Q2 (see Chart 5). The main drivers 
of growth were the commodities-exporting economies. In year-on-year terms, however, 
Activity and demand
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Aggregate of the seven main economies.
LATIN AMERICAN GDP 
Year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter rates  
CHART 5
-6 
-3 
0 
3 
6 
9 
12 
2008 2009 2010 
 BRAZIL  LATIN AMERICA (a)
  ARGENTINA  PERU 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Year-on-year rate 
% 
-12 
-9 
-6 
-3 
0 
3 
6 
9 
12 
2008 2009 2010 20112011
 VENEZUELA  CHILE 
 MEXICO  COLOMBIA 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Year-on-year rate 
% 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
09 10 11 09 10 11 09 10 11 09 10 11 
Mexico Brazil Argentina Latin America (a) 
% 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
Quarter-on-quarter rate 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 104 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2011 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2011
there was an across-the-board slowdown in activity, from 5.5% at the start of the year to 
4.3% in Q2, about 2 pp below the related 2010 figures.
The main explanatory factor behind this easing in activity was the diminished dynamism of 
domestic demand which, even so, remained relatively robust and contributed 5.9 pp to 
growth (see Chart 6), while the negative contribution of external demand lessened to 
1.6 pp in Q2. Set against the tightening of monetary policy virtually across the board in the 
first half of the year, and with relatively few changes in respect of the external factors af-
fecting growth in the region (capital flows and commodities prices), the slowdown should 
be attributed to a resumption of growth rates more compatible with potential, following the 
strong rebound in 2010 after the crisis (see Chart 7). Indeed, a trend-cycle calculation 
shows that, at the end of 2010, most of the Latin American economies were posting growth 
rates far higher than trend, with the output gap closing. Also, from early 2011 relatively 
rapid convergence began towards rates that were more sustainable and even below trend 
in some cases (Brazil). The only exceptions would be Mexico and, above all, Venezuela, 
where the recession has been more protracted. Argentina is expected in 2011 to be the 
economy that is most overheating.
In terms of components, demand is showing a regional pattern very similar to that in 2010, 
albeit with a lesser contribution of inventories and greater balance between domestic and 
external demand. Private consumption has continued to be the main engine of growth, 
posting a year-on-year rate of 6% in Q2, underpinned by the favourable labour market 
situation, the increase in real wages in most of the countries and the pick-up in credit (see 
Chart 6). In fact, the unemployment rate across the region continued to fall, down to 6.8% 
of the labour force at the end of Q2, which was close to the historical lows in several South 
American countries. In Mexico, the situation is different insofar as the pre-crisis unemploy-
ment rate has not been reached, and employment has been resilient partly owing to the 
increase in informal-economy jobs. Gross capital formation, though it eased from its very 
high rate in early 2010, has continued growing at a pace of over 9% year-on-year. With 
perspective, however, it appears that investment measured as a percentage of GDP has 
not taken off in all the countries, something which might have been expected given the 
favourable economic outlook and the widespread availability of financing (see Chart 7). 
The contribution of stockbuilding to growth declined, while government consumption 
quickened in some countries (Argentina) and tended to moderate in others (markedly so in 
Mexico). Finally, the slowdown in exports in real terms (6.7% year-on-year) and the con-
tinuing strength of imports (14.7% year-on-year) explain why external demand has contin-
ued contributing negatively to growth.
Across the various countries, the moderation in growth is also partly due to specific caus-
es. In Brazil it has been concentrated in the industrial sector, a fact linked to the exchange-
rate appreciation. Indeed, industrial production in Brazil posted a year-on-year growth rate 
that was negative in July, and only moderately positive in August, especially in the capital 
and intermediate goods sectors, while employment in industry showed signs of weakness 
despite the general momentum of the labour market, with an unemployment rate at a his-
torical low (6%). These trends are also discernible in business confidence indices, which 
have likewise trended downwards since virtually the beginning of 2011 (see Chart 8). How-
ever, the indicators of domestic demand (consumption, imports, retail sales and lending) 
continue to rise at a dynamic pace, outstripping the supply-side indicators (see Chart 8). 
Higher growth in domestic demand as opposed to in supply is a trend common to a 
greater or lesser degree to the other commodities-exporting countries (Chile, Peru and 
Argentina; see the section “Economic developments by country”). In Mexico, the slowdown 
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SOURCES: National statistics and IMF.
a Seven biggest economies.
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Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
GDP (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America (a) 4.3 -2.0 6.3 -2.6 1.7 5.8 7.9 5.9 5.3 5.5 4.3
    Argentina (b) 6.8 0.9 9.2 -0.3 2.6 6.8 11.8 8.6 9.2 9.9 9.1
    Brazil 5.2 -0.6 7.5 -1.8 5.0 9.3 9.2 6.7 5.0 4.2 3.1
    Mexico 1.5 -6.1 5.5 -5.5 -2.0 4.5 7.6 5.1 4.4 4.6 3.3
    Chile 3.7 -1.7 5.2 -1.4 2.1 1.7 6.4 6.9 5.8 10.0 6.8
    Colombia (c) 3.5 1.5 4.3 1.1 2.9 3.7 4.7 3.4 5.4 4.7 5.2
    Venezuela 4.8 -3.3 -1.4 -4.6 -5.8 -4.8 -1.7 -0.2 0.5 4.8 2.5
    Peru 9.8 0.9 8.8 -0.6 3.4 6.2 10.0 9.6 9.2 8.7 6.7
CPI (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America (a) 7.8 6.4 6.4 5.9 5.4 6.1 6.5 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.6 7.0
    Argentina (b) 8.6 6.3 10.5 5.9 7.1 9.0 10.6 11.1 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.9
    Brazil 5.7 4.9 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.9 5.1 4.6 5.6 6.1 6.6 7.3
    Mexico 5.1 5.3 4.2 5.1 4.0 4.8 4.0 3.7 4.2 3.5 3.3 3.1
    Chile 8.7 0.4 1.4 -1.9 -3.0 -0.3 1.2 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.3
    Colombia 7.0 4.2 2.3 3.2 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.3 3.0 3.7
    Venezuela 31.4 28.6 29.0 28.7 28.1 27.4 31.9 29.8 27.3 29.1 24.6 26.7
    Peru 5.8 2.9 1.5 1.9 0.4 0.7 1.1 2.2 2.1 2.4 3.1 3.7
BUDGET BALANCE (% of GDP) (d)
    Latin America (a) (e) -0.5 -2.9 -2.2 -3.1 -2.8 -2.7 -2.5 -2.0 -2.2 -1.8 -1.6
    Argentina 1.4 -0.6 0.2 -1.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0
    Brazil -2.0 -3.3 -2.6 -4.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.3 -2.3 -2.6 -2.3 -2.2
    Mexico -0.1 -2.3 -2.8 -2.3 -2.1 -1.8 -2.2 -2.4 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8
    Chile 5.0 -4.6 -0.3 -3.9 -4.6 -3.9 -1.1 0.0 -0.3 1.0 1.5
    Colombia -1.8 -3.8 -3.6 -3.2 -3.8 -3.4 -4.0 -3.6 -3.5 -2.9 -1.6
    Venezuela -1.2 -5.1 — -3.9 -5.1 -4.8 -3.8 -3.5 — — —
    Peru 2.2 -1.8 0.0 -0.7 -1.8 -1.3 -0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3
PUBLIC DEBT (% of GDP)
    Latin America (a) 30.7 34.7 33.7 34.5 34.2 34.1 33.3 33.5 33.1 33.5 —
    Argentina 44.7 47.9 44.6 46.4 45.8 47.9 40.5 43.3 41.3 44.3 —
    Brazil 38.5 42.8 40.4 43.3 42.8 41.9 40.9 40.3 40.2 39.9 39.7
    Mexico 24.3 28.0 27.4 27.5 26.3 27.7 27.7 27.4 26.0 27.1 26.9
    Chile 5.2 6.2 9.2 5.8 6.1 6.9 7.5 8.7 9.2 9.6 10.1
    Colombia 33.2 34.7 34.8 33.6 35.1 34.3 35.0 34.7 34.7 34.8 33.1
    Venezuela 13.6 22.6 28.4 20.4 22.6 19.0 22.4 26.1 28.4 26.9 —
    Peru 24.2 27.3 23.9 27.2 27.3 25.5 23.7 23.2 23.5 22.5 21.8
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% of GDP) (d)
    Latin America (a) -0.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8
    Argentina 2.0 3.6 1.0 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.3 1.4 0.8 0.7 0.3
    Brazil -1.7 -1.5 -2.3 -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 -2.1 -2.4 -2.3 -2.3 -2.1
    Mexico -1.5 -0.7 -0.5 -1.4 -0.6 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8
    Chile -1.9 1.6 1.9 0.7 2.6 2.4 1.8 1.6 1.9 0.9 0.6
    Colombia -2.8 -2.2 -3.1 -2.7 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 -2.8 -3.1 -3.2 -3.4
    Venezuela 12.0 2.6 6.1 -0.6 2.6 6.0 6.8 6.3 6.0 6.5 8.4
    Peru -4.2 0.2 -1.5 -1.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.9 -1.5 -1.5 -2.1
EXTERNAL DEBT (% of GDP)
    Latin America (a) 17.5 20.6 20.7 20.8 19.8 19.7 19.1 20.4 20.6 20.5 19.8
    Argentina 38.3 37.9 34.9 39.2 36.3 36.9 31.5 34.2 32.3 33.5 27.4
    Brazil 12.0 12.4 12.2 14.0 12.2 11.9 12.0 12.3 12.3 12.6 12.3
    Mexico 11.5 18.5 18.2 17.0 16.8 17.9 17.8 18.4 19.0 18.5 18.4
    Chile 38.0 45.9 42.3 45.3 45.0 42.8 42.2 43.4 42.5 42.6 42.6
    Colombia 19.1 22.7 22.6 21.9 22.9 18.8 19.3 21.5 22.5 20.6 20.9
    Venezuela 19.4 22.6 35.5 21.4 22.6 23.8 25.1 31.1 35.8 34.4 35.0
    Peru 27.3 28.1 26.1 28.6 28.1 27.3 25.4 26.6 26.4 26.1 25.6
2009 2010 2011
2008 2009 2010
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1
SOURCES: National statistics.
a Aggregate of the 7 countries represented.
b ???cial ?gures.
c Seasonally adjusted. 
d Four-quarter moving average. 
e As from 2010 Q4, the budget balance aggregate does not include Venezuela.
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during the first half of the year has coincided with the downturn in the US industrial cycle 
in recent months. This suggests that, despite the pick-up in recent quarters, Mexican do-
mestic demand is not generating sufficiently self-sustained growth as to mitigate high 
external dependency.
Against this background, credit to the private sector continued to increase at a rate of 
close to 20% (see Chart 8) in real terms in August in the region as a whole, with some eas-
ing observable in certain countries (in Brazil, for example, further to its monetary tightening 
measures) and an acceleration in others (Argentina, or Chile and Mexico, departing from 
much more moderate rates). One of the main factors that has pushed such growth up-
wards in recent quarters has been the increase in net capital flows. In fact, the episodes of 
increasing capital inflows are one of the main determinants of the excessive expansion in 
credit.1 This risk has been perceived as potentially significant in Brazil, given the greater 
size and liquidity of its financial markets, and the possibility that the availability of financing 
might provide for an easing of lending standards, or the formation of bubbles in the prices 
of certain assets. In this respect, although excessive growth in some segments cannot be 
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Seven biggest economies.
b Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela.
c Eight biggest economies.
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1  WEO, October 2011, chapter 1, and BIS Quarterly Report (2011).
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ruled out, the risk of a bout of generalised overexpansion seems low. Mortgage lending 
still accounts for only 4.2% of GDP in Brazil, despite its recent dynamism, and it is in the 
main directed2, the consequence of the stimulus policies in this sector. Public credit is 
decelerating, and the recent slowdown in capital inflows should also temper in part this 
expansion. The acceleration in this variable is also a concern in Argentina, although it is 
from a very low base, in a setting in which uncertainty over the elections appears to be 
reflected in deposits, dollarisation and capital outflows.
Finally, developments in the external sector in Latin America were determined to August by 
the prevalence of high commodities prices and of capital flows. Thus, as a result of some 
easing in the growth of imports in nominal terms and of the continuing robust increase in 
exports (above all due to the price effect), the trade surplus in the region increased slightly, 
to 2.2% of GDP (see Chart 9). Meantime, the current account deficit stabilised at somewhat 
below 1% of regional GDP, largely due to the worsening of the incomes balance (owing to 
the habitual repatriation of dividends from the commodities-exporting economies). This 
situation is expected to have changed in September, although the trade balance figures are 
SOURCES: National statistics, central banks and Banco de España.
a Customs data in dollars, aggregate of the seven biggest economies.
b Four-quarter moving average.
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2  The stock of mortgage lending is 155.7 billion reales, 146 billion of which relate to directed lending.
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not yet available, in light of the collapse in the prices (in some cases up to 20%) of the re-
gion’s main commodities. It should also be stressed that practically all the countries saw 
their current account deficit widen or their surpluses narrow during the six-month period, 
this being offset only by the substantial widening of the current surplus in Venezuela to 
8.4% of GDP. In respect of the capital account, foreign direct investment continued com-
fortably to finance the current deficit, although in circumstances such as the present in 
which there is a change in market sentiment, the external position – which was a strength 
at the start of the crisis given its surplus situation – might now prove to be a weakness in 
some countries (chiefly Colombia and Brazil). This vulnerability, however, would be partly 
compensated for by the increase in central bank foreign exchange reserves, which have 
reached far higher levels in all the countries than those in place pre-crisis.
Far from stabilising, inflation in Latin America rebounded in the period of 2011 under study, 
placing the year-on-year rate of the aggregate for the region at 7% in September, 0.5 pp 
up on the end-2010 figure. As in the previous six-month period, much of this rise was due 
to the behaviour of prices in Brazil, where annual inflation rose to 7.3% in September (far 
above the upper target band). That said, Peru, too, among the countries pursuing infla-
tion targets, posted an above-target rise in prices (see Chart 10). By contrast, in Chile, 
Prices and 
macroeconomic policies
SOURCES: National statistics and Banco de España.
a Aggregate of the seven main economies.
b ???cial rates.
c Banco de España calculations stripping out the food and energy indices from the overall index.
d Weighted average of the o??cial rates of the ?ve countries with in?ation targets.
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Colombia and Mexico, inflation tended to stand within the central bank target range (see 
Table 2). The increase in food prices at the start of the year continues to explain part of the 
rise in the overall indices, although core inflation pressures have been observed in some 
countries, particularly in Brazil, where it stood at a six-year high of 6.7% year-on-year, ow-
ing to the rise in services prices. Yet in the other countries with inflation targets, core infla-
tion performed better. In Mexico, for instance, it held stable against a background of ample 
output, low growth in labour costs and an appreciating currency to June. In Argentina, in-
flation stood at around 10% (while wage increases are running at 20%/25%, the range in 
which the unofficial inflation measures stand), and in Venezuela it climbed to 26.5%.
Against this background, the cycle of interest rate rises in which four of the five countries 
with an inflation target in the region since 2010 were immersed continued during the first 
seven months of the year. In Brazil, the official rate climbed to 12.5% in July, after three 
25 bp rises; in Chile and Colombia there were five consecutive increases totalling 200 bp, 
also to July; and in Peru the benchmark rate increased by 250 bp to May. The upshot was 
a considerable tightening of monetary conditions, and at the same time this increased the 
incentives for carry trade and exchange rate appreciation. Indeed, to contain the pressure 
on exchange rates, the first eight months of the year saw a build-up of reserves of more 
than $100 billion in the region (an increase of 18%), mainly in Brazil and Mexico. This trend 
was reversed in September in the face of downward pressure on the currencies.
In late August, however, the Brazilian central bank unexpectedly cut its official interest rate by 
50 bp, highlighting in its communiqué the change in the international scenario, which involved 
a significant increase in the risks to the Brazilian economy through various channels, such as 
trade flows, external investment and confidence effects. This shift in the global scenario 
would in principle entail a more favourable balance of risks in respect of containing inflation, 
allowing for convergence on the target of 4.5% in 2012, a perception strengthened by the 
prospect of greater fiscal restriction, announced during the summer. Nonetheless, survey-
based inflation expectations for 2011 have tended to rise moderately in recent months, and 
this trend has continued despite the cut in rates. In the remaining countries in the region, the 
upward interest rate cycle has been interrupted, and in some cases (Chile, Mexico) there has 
been some indication of the possibility of a cut in rates. Yield curves, which retained a very 
positive slope until late July, incorporating expectations of a rise, have become inverted and 
are currently discounting declines which, in some cases, are very significant (more than 
100 bp before the end of the year in Brazil, more than 50 bp in Chile and 25 bp in Mexico). All 
these developments point to a further change in the interest rate cycle in the region.
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecast.
a September 2011 Consensus Forecast for the end of the year.
2012
Country Target December Ful?llment September Expectations (a) Expectations (a)
Brazil 4.5 ± 2 5.9 Yes 7.3 6.4 5.4
Mexico 3 ± 1 4.4 No 3.1 3.4 3.7
Chile 3 ± 1 3.0 Yes 3.3 3.4 3.0
Colombia 3 ± 1 3.2 Yes 3.7 3.4 3.4
Peru 2 ± 1 2.1 Yes 3.7 3.4 2.6
2010 2011
INFLATION 
Year-on-year rates of change 
TABLE 2
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In the fiscal policy realm there were no notable new developments during the six-month pe-
riod, except perhaps the announcement by Brazil of an increase in its primary surplus for 
2011. This was interpreted as a sign of greater fiscal restriction. However, it should be borne 
in mind that the strength of revenue provided for an improvement in public finances at the 
regional level (with some exceptions, such as Argentina; see the section “Economic develop-
ments by country”), despite the fact that public spending continued to grow at a rate far 
above that of the economy’s nominal growth. Other countries, such as Peru, defined moder-
ately expansionary fiscal policy measures after the elections. One key question worth asking 
is how fiscal policies in Latin America should react in the event of a significant slowdown in 
global growth, and if there would be headroom, as in 2008-2009, to apply countercyclical 
policies. In this respect, although at the regional level the primary public balance has in-
creased to 2% of GDP in 2011 (see Chart 11), this is considerably below the level of 4% 
reached in 2008. By contrast, developments in structural primary balances – the change in 
which is habitually taken as an indicator of the fiscal impulse3 – appeared to show that in 
several countries fiscal policy has been countercyclical both in 2010, when negative output 
SOURCES: IMF Fiscal Monitor September 2011 and national statistics.
a A negative sign denotes an increase in general government spending between 2008 and 2011.
b Seven biggest economies.
c De?ated by the CPI.
d Excludes untendered debt in the debt swap offers of 2005 and 2010.
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3  Increases (reductions) in the structural primary balance entail contractionary (expansionary) fiscal impulses.
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gaps were accompanied by an expansionary fiscal impulse, and in 2011, when positive gaps 
and contractionary fiscal impulses prevailed, though in some countries, given the boom in 
their domestic demand, it might have been so to a greater extent. This highlights the potential 
usefulness of fiscal rules (see Box 2), which will help endow fiscal policy with a more mark-
edly countercyclical nature in the long run. 
The main headway made in regional integration processes and the external integration of 
the Latin American countries was the approval in October of the free trade treaty between 
the United States and Colombia by the US Congress (along with the free trade treaties with 
Korea and Panama), which had been signed five years earlier, following Colombia’s ac-
ceptance of an amendment in the protection to employed nationals, and the Republicans’ 
acceptance of an extension of the subsidies to US employees affected by these agree-
ments. Conversely, there was no significant progress in the negotiation of the agreement 
between Mercosur and the EU, and the EU proposed amending the tariff preferences 
granted to developing countries, which would adversely affect Argentina and Brazil.
Protectionist tensions arose once more in Mercosur, warranted in part by a strong appre-
ciation of the attendant currencies that detracts from competitiveness. The Brazilian au-
thorities launched non-automatic import licences for automobiles and their parts, some-
thing which affects almost 40% of Argentine exports to Brazil, and also bears on the sector 
on which the development of the bloc was originally based. Likewise, Brazil proposed that 
each member should raise its tariffs individually against third countries in the face of sud-
den increases in imports, which would deactivate, de facto, the Common External Tariff, 
while Argentina suggested that the aim of the bloc was the replacement of imports at the 
regional level. Peru furthered its strategy to re-orient its trade through bilateral treaties, and 
entered into agreements with Costa Rica and Panama, along with an Economic Comple-
mentation Agreement with Brazil and Argentina (which will allow the entry of almost 100% 
of Peruvian products into these two countries from 2012), and with Mexico. Finally, Ecua-
dor, in light of the expiry in February of the ATPDA tariffs granted by the United States, 
announced a compensation programme for affected exporters in the form of tax rebates.
In terms of structural reforms, progress was scant. In the main, such reforms were aimed 
at increasing the States’ fiscal resources. In Argentina, a project was submitted to 
amend the central bank’s organic charter, which requires the central bank to “co-ordi-
nate its mission with the government”, obliging it to finance social activities and pro-
grammes, i.e. converting it into something closer to a development bank. In Venezuela, 
legislation was approved to raise the tax burden for the oil sector, the prohibition on 
PDVSA having government members as directors was repealed, and the nationalisation 
of gold mining was approved, which sets a maximum 45% holding for foreign compa-
nies in such concerns and prohibits the export of the metal, in addition to raising royal-
ties from 3% to 13% and subjecting contracts to national jurisdiction. In Peru, the new 
government reached an agreement with mining companies to set in place a new tax 
regime, which would provide additional revenue for the State equivalent to 0.7% of GDP 
per annum. In Mexico, the end of the congressional sessions period in the run-up to the 
July 2012 elections prevented approval of the political and labour reforms proposed in 
2010. In Chile, however, the government unveiled 50 so-called Competitive Impulse 
Agenda measures aimed at improving competitiveness with the goal of growth at a rate 
of 6% per annum. It should be stressed, lastly, that, following the agreement on the in-
tegration of the stock markets of Colombia, Peru and Chile in late April, the volume of 
transactions has been minimal, and the plans to merge the stock markets of Colombia 
and Peru have been discontinued.
Trade integration 
processes and structural 
policies
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BOX 2FISCAL RULES IN LATIN AMERICA
Since 1994 a growing number of countries around the world (ap-
proximately 80 at present) have adopted fiscal rules.1 The severe 
fiscal deterioration in the developed countries has provided fresh 
impetus for adopting or reinforcing fiscal rules (including at the 
constitutional level, as recently seen in Spain) in order to strength-
en fiscal credibility and ensure the sustainability of public debt.2 
The advisability of having fiscal rules stems from the well-docu-
mented fact that fiscal policies show a bias towards deficit. This 
bias may be explained by: i) the common ownership of public re-
sources; ii) typical principal-agent problems (information is asym-
metrical and the interests of elected representatives do not always 
coincide with those of voters), and iii) time-inconsistency prob-
lems (the fiscal position reflects not only the business cycle, but 
also the political cycle).
Adding to these broad considerations in Latin America is the spe-
cific feature whereby fiscal policy has always been notably procy-
clical, partly owing to the exposure of the regions’ countries to 
market economic fluctuations resulting from changes in the terms 
of trade and in the ability to raise financing abroad. Thus, it has 
often been difficult for governments in this region to commit them-
selves credibly to saving extraordinary revenue (arising from the 
cycle or from the rise in commodities prices) in good times, owing 
to the pressures to increase public spending in democratic but 
very unequal societies. Accordingly and traditionally, “sufficient 
fiscal space” was not created to counter the shortage of financing 
in bad times, or to prevent the rapid changes in investor sentiment 
and ease the vulnerability to financial crises. In this respect, in-
stead of offsetting cyclical shocks, discretionary fiscal policy may 
have contributed to increasing macroeconomic volatility and fiscal 
vulnerability in the region. Against this background, and to pro-
mote greater economic stability and to achieve the sustainability 
of public debt, the biggest countries in the region have in recent 
years adopted fiscal rules. The purpose of this Box is to review 
their characteristics and to show the main differences and simi-
larities. Panel 1 summarises the main characteristics of the fiscal 
rules in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.3
Fiscal rules are usually defined as commitments specified as nu-
merical targets for certain key fiscal variables: budget balance, 
public revenue, public spending and public debt, among others, 
so as to establish a framework for fiscal policy that is independent 
of the political cycle. While discretionary fiscal policy may be ad-
visable in some circumstances (for instance, in the presence of 
unexpected shocks that require a rapid political response), there is 
growing evidence that such discretionality tends to lead to a sub-
SOURCES: National laws and references cited in the text.
a CG = Central Government; NFPS = Non-Financial Public Sector; SNG = Sub-National Governments.
Country Original law Latest amendment
Stabilisation 
instrument?
Level of 
government (a)  
Numerical 
target?
Related institution(s)
Golden 
rule?
Exceptions to 
the rule?
Argentina
Law 25.152 on Fiscal 
Solvency (1999)
Law 25.917, General 
Fiscal Responsibility 
Regime (2004)
No
CG, SNG 
(agreement 
with CG)
Yes
FCRF (Federal Council 
for Fiscal Responsibility)
Yes Yes
Brazil
Law on Fiscal 
Responsibility and 
Municipal Public 
Finances (2000)
No
NFPS 
(without 
Petrobras)
In separate 
legislation
Fonfo Soberano do Brasil 
(Brazil Sovereign Fund)
Yes Yes
Chile
Law 20.128 on Fiscal 
Responsibility (2006)
Yes CG
Yes (set by 
government)
Economic and Social 
Stability Fund/Pensions 
Reserve Fund
No No
Colombia Law 358 (1997) Law 1473 (2011) Yes CG Yes
Consultative Committee 
for the Fiscal Rule, 
Saving Fund and Fiscal 
and Macroeconomic 
Stabilisation
No Yes
Mexico
Federal Budget and 
Fiscal Responsibility 
Law (2006)
No CG Yes Stabilisation Fund No Yes
Peru
Law 27.245 on 
Prudence and Fiscal 
Transparency (1999)
No NFPS Yes Stabilisation Fund Yes Yes
1  New Zealand was the pioneer in setting fiscal rules. See IMF (2009), Fis-
cal rules anchoring expectations for sustainable public finances, Fiscal 
Affairs Department.
2  For Spain’s case see, for example, the article “The reform of the fiscal 
framework in Spain: constitutional limits and the new public spending 
growth rule”, published in the October 2011 edition of the Banco de Es-
paña’s Economic Bulletin.
3  In Venezuela the fiscal ruled has frequently been changed or suspended 
in recent years.
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optimal result, taking the form of the above-mentioned bias to-
wards deficit, or to the application of procyclical and, therefore, 
destabilising fiscal policies.4
Numerical fiscal rules take various forms in the region and pursue 
different non-exclusive objectives. An initial group of fiscal rules fo-
cuses on the attainment of fiscal sustainability. This is the case of 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru, who set limits on various vari-
ables such as budget balances (primary or total), total public 
spending or specific categories thereof, the servicing of public debt 
or public debt per se (expressed as a percentage of GDP, as a 
growth rate or as a total volume). In most cases the so-called “gold-
en rule” is applied, whereby spending on public investment is ex-
cluded from the ceilings on public spending so as to prevent public 
investment from being the item subject to adjustment. In all these 
cases, too, limits on the financing that the central bank may grant to 
the public sector are included.5 The advantages of this type of fiscal 
rule are, chiefly, that they are simple, transparent and easily control-
lable. Among the possible drawbacks is the lack of flexibility im-
posed on fiscal policy, although in almost all countries “escape 
clauses” have been added for extreme circumstances, such as se-
rious economic crises or natural disasters. Another potentially ad-
verse element is that a certain degree of “creative accounting” 
might be encouraged in order to ensure fulfilment of the targets.
A second group of fiscal rules has as a priority to preserve cyclical 
stabilisation capacity (by allowing the operation of the automatic 
stabilisers), though without forgetting the commitment to fiscal 
sustainability. These types of rules are usually based on: i) a budg-
et balance target over the course of a business cycle, or ii) nu-
merical targets for the structural balance (adjusted by the business 
cycle and/or commodities prices) for each year. In this connection, 
these rules seem particularly appropriate for addressing the chal-
lenges that uncertain and volatile revenues (depending in many 
cases on commodities prices) pose to fiscal management in many 
Latin American countries. Set against the greater flexibility of 
these types of rules is their greater complexity and the inevitable 
degree of arbitrariness of the techniques used in estimating output 
gaps, long-term commodities prices and budgetary elasticities. At 
present, only the Chilean government follows a rule of this type, 
which sets a target on the structural budget balance (isolating the 
effect of the business cycle and of copper and molybdenum prices 
from public revenue).6 In the coming years, fiscal policy in Colom-
bia will also follow a similar outline, since regulations are currently 
being implemented on the basis of the law approved in July.
This second type of fiscal rule is habitually associated with the 
setting up of stabilisation funds, generated on the basis of the fis-
cal surpluses in economic boom times, which allow public spend-
ing to be funded during recessions. Thus, for instance, Chile main-
tains its Economic and Social Stabilisation Fund7 which, in addi-
tion to acting as an automatic stabiliser, has allowed the Chilean 
government to apply countercyclical measures in the recent finan-
cial crisis (making withdrawals from the Fund for an amount equal 
to 5.7% of GDP in 2009). In any event, it should be stressed that 
all the other countries in the region have these types of stabilisa-
tion funds to lessen the impact of recessions or sharp declines in 
commodities prices, although only in Peru is the fund of a signifi-
cant size (close to 3.4% of GDP in August 2011).
In all the countries in the region except in Chile, the application of fis-
cal rules is not confined to central government but also encompasses 
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SOURCE: IMF, Fiscal Monitor. 
4  G. Kopits (2001), Fiscal rules: useful policy framework or unnecessary 
ornament?, IMF Working Paper 01/145.
5  The legal instruments used may be constitutional provisions or other 
high-level rules, ordinary legislation or simply a broad policy guideline. 
The legislation also usually includes sanctions relating to non-compli-
ance (at the institutional or individual level).
6  The rule might be reviewed in the coming months following the guide-
lines offered by an advisory committee set up to this end.
7  Likewise, the Pension Reserve Fund receives contributions to meet fu-
ture obligations of the public pension system.
BOX 2FISCAL RULES IN LATIN AMERICA (cont’d)
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other tiers of government. When there are several levels of govern-
ment, the risk of some of these sub-national governments failing to be 
fiscally accountable multiplies. The provisions governing sub-national 
fiscal behaviour may be adopted following a top-down or a bottom-
up approach. In the first case, the central authority establishes a se-
ries of numerical rules for the sub-national governments. This type of 
approach can be seen in countries with a federal structure, in experi-
ences involving the bail-out of sub-national governments (Brazil), or in 
fiscally more centralised countries in which the Constitution gives the 
central government power to legislate in all areas and to decide which 
fiscal resources it delegates to the sub-national governments (Colom-
bia and Peru). However, it is much more difficult to set consistent fis-
cal rules through a bottom-up approach, i.e. when sub-national gov-
ernments voluntarily adopt binding rules (Argentina). In any event, 
fiscal rules for sub-national governments are particularly useful in 
cases in which market discipline does not function correctly.
A fiscal rule is better accepted politically and socially if an inde-
pendent fiscal monitoring agency is entrusted with its application, 
since it is considered that this significantly reduces the risks of ma-
nipulation of the rule for political motives. This is especially the case 
for rules based on structural budget balances. However, only in Ar-
gentina is there a body of these characteristics, although its func-
tions focus more on the monitoring of sub-national governments.8
Assessing the effects of fiscal rules on fiscal performance is not 
straightforward, partly because in some cases the rules have 
been in force for very few years, and above all because there are 
sample-selection and identification problems (since in some 
countries fiscal rules are part of a broader macroeconomic poli-
cy framework) that mean that the econometric analysis is prone 
to certain limitations.9 However, numerous fiscal indicators 
show that the region faced the recent global financial crisis in a 
more favourable fiscal position than in the past, which is partly a 
reflection of the efforts made in previous years.10 Thus, unlike in 
previous episodes, during the global financial crisis almost all 
the countries in the region were able to pursue a countercyclical 
fiscal policy to a greater or lesser extent: as the panel shows, as 
activity was weakening the structural primary balance declined, 
suggesting the existence of an expansionary fiscal impulse. Fur-
ther, fiscal policy retained its countercyclical nature as output 
gaps closed in 2010 in nearly all the countries and as the fiscal 
impulse turned contractionary in several of them.
8  The report of the advisory committee for the design of a second-gener-
ation structurally balanced fiscal policy for Chile recommends the crea-
tion of this type of body.
9  The empirical studies available suggest that fiscal consolidation pro-
cesses were already under way before the introduction of fiscal rules, 
although these might have served to reaffirm and institutionalise 
these processes. See, for example, C. Caceres, A. Corbacho and L. 
Medina (2010), Structural breaks in fiscal performance: did fiscal re-
sponsibility laws have anything to do with them?, IMF Working Paper 
10/248.
10  C. Daude, A. Melguizo and A. Neut (2010), Fiscal policy in Latin Amer-
ica: countercyclical and sustainable of last?, OECD Development Cen-
tre Working Paper no. 291.
The Brazilian economy slowed in Q2, posting a quarter-on-quarter growth rate of 0.8%, 
compared with 1.2% in Q1. As a result, year-on-year growth continued to ease, albeit 
more markedly so than envisaged (to 3.1% in Q2). And judging by the monthly GDP indica-
tors, this trend appears to be sharper in Q3. Accounting for this lesser dynamism is the 
slowdown in domestic demand, which contributed 4.3 pp to GDP growth, due above all to 
the lower growth of investment, since private consumption remained strong (5.5% year-
on-year). The slowdown in investment may be attributable to the strength of the exchange 
rate (and its effect on industry), but also to the closing of the output gap or to structural 
factors (such as the tax level, or the cost of access to credit). The labour market continues 
to trend favourably, with a very low unemployment rate (6% in August), and with notable 
growth in real wages. Inflation has performed poorly, posting year-on-year rates of over 
6.5% since April (above the central bank’s target range, whose mid-point is at 4.5% with 
bands of +/-2%), and climbing to 7.3% year-on-year in September, evidencing demand 
pressures. Nonetheless, the central bank cut its official interest rate by 50 bp at its August 
meeting and by 50 bp in October, lowering it to 11.5%, after respective 25 bp increases at 
its April, June and July meetings. The central bank stressed that this change in stance was 
due to the worsening of the external environment. Domestic lending to the private sector 
held at a high growth rate, of around 20% year-on-year in real terms in the period under 
study, despite the numerous measures adopted in the preceding months in an attempt to 
temper it. Directed lending was more buoyant, although it slowed to a rate of 23% in July. 
Economic developments 
by country
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 116 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2011 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2011
On the fiscal front, the primary surplus accumulated over the 12 months to July increased 
to 3.8% of GDP (in 2010 as a whole it was 2.8%), and the deficit after interest payments 
dipped to 1.9% of GDP, from 2.6% at the close of 2010. Net debt fell to 39.4% of GDP, 
largely owing to the effect of growth. These positive fiscal results are associated with the 
favourable trend of revenue, which in the case of central government increased at a year-
on-year rate of 20% to August, compared with the 11% increase in expenditure. Against 
this background, the government announced an increase in the consolidated public sector 
primary surplus target in 2011 of between 0.25% and 0.3% of GDP, raising it to 3.35% of 
GDP; that said, the increase does not entail any long-term commitment. The first draft 
budget for 2012 was unveiled, setting a primary surplus target of 3.1% of GDP, on the 
basis of assumptions as to GDP and inflation which are now considered overly optimistic. 
Turning to the external sector, the current account deficit widened, since the higher trade 
balance surplus (driven by the increase in exports) was more than offset by the widening 
of the incomes deficit. Heavy financial inflows continued, most notably in the case of for-
eign direct investment. Over the past 12 months to August this year, financial inflows to-
talled $87 billion, and foreign direct investment inflows $54 billion, with both comfortably 
financing the current account deficit (see Chart 12). In these circumstances the central 
bank maintained its reserves accumulation policy for most of the six-month period, al-
though in late September it sold dollars on the futures market to resolve the dollar-liquidi-
ty problems and the abrupt depreciation in the real. Moody’s upgraded the Brazilian sov-
ereign debt rating, placing it a notch above investment grade.
In the first half of 2011, year-on-year growth continued to fall in Mexico, declining to a rate 
of 3.3% in Q2. GDP thus resumed its maximum pre-crisis level in 2011 Q1, marking a rela-
tively sluggish recovery. Indeed, Mexico, along with Venezuela, would be the only country 
whose output gap continues to be negative according to the exercise conducted. Notable 
in the breakdown on the demand side is the positive contribution of the external sector to 
GDP growth in the first half of the year (0.7 pp), Mexico being the only country in the region 
where this is seen, owing to a strong slowdown in the growth of imports, probably linked 
to the deceleration in private consumption. Conversely, private investment, especially in 
capital goods, quickened somewhat. That may be due to the recovery of the US industrial 
cycle, although also to the statistical effect following two years of decline. By contrast, 
public investment posted a negative growth rate, as did government consumption. Ac-
cordingly, domestic demand slowed, growing at a rate of 2.9% in 2011 Q2. The data re-
leased for 2011 Q3 and the leading indicators (see Chart 12) point to a further slowdown 
in activity, partly as a result of the lower growth recorded in the United States, which 
shows the limitations of the Mexican economy in generating domestic demand-led self-
sustained growth. In the labour market, formal employment grew at a year-on-year rate of 
4.5%, with temporary employment proving more buoyant. In this setting, inflation contin-
ued to perform favourably, standing at 3.1% in September, slightly above the mid-point of 
the target range (3%). Core inflation held at a rate of between 3.1% and 3.3% in the first 
eight months of the year. Slack output, low growth in labour costs and the appreciation of 
the currency, at least until July, contributed to maintaining this benign inflation picture. The 
central bank held its benchmark rate at 4.5%, although its latest communiqué paved the 
way for possible cuts if global conditions were to continue worsening. Bank lending to the 
private sector continued to accelerate, to a year-on-year growth rate in real terms of slight-
ly over 10%, with a higher rate for consumer credit. In the fiscal arena, public finances 
worsened slightly over the six-month period. Excluding investment by the State-held com-
pany PEMEX, the deficit stood at 1.1% of GDP in annualised terms, 0.4 pp up on 2010. 
This was the result of the increase in public revenue to a real year-on-year rate of 4.6%, 
thanks to the rise in oil-related revenue, and in public spending to 5.3%. One of the 
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incipient risks is that relating to the financing of the federal states, given that their debt has 
risen by 1 pp of GDP to 2.5%, since 2008, and three of them are in a difficult position with 
debts exceeding 50% of their revenue. Accordingly, in mid-August the Finance Ministry 
announced a programme of guarantees for issues by the federal states that need to refi-
nance their liabilities or increase investment in infrastructure. The current account balance 
posted a deficit of 0.6% of GDP in the first half of the year as a result of the increase in the 
deficit on the balance of services and on that of incomes, while the financial account ran a 
surplus of 4.1% of GDP, due both to the higher surplus under the foreign direct investment 
heading (although that received by Mexico declined, there was a practical freeze on Mex-
ican direct investment abroad) and, especially, to portfolio investment for bond purchases 
(close to 2.8% of GDP). The central bank retained the mechanism for reducing volatility in 
the exchange rate appreciation and for building up reserves, which climbed to $138 billion 
at end-October, i.e. 11.4% of GDP. The government launched several local-currency 
and foreign-currency issues, including the re-opening of the 100-year bond for a value 
of $1 billion in the first week of August, amid the turbulence on global financial markets.
Economic activity in Argentina remained notably buoyant. GDP grew at a quarter-on-
quarter rate of 2.5% in Q2 (3.1% in Q1), and at a year-on-year rate of 9.1% (9.9% the 
previous quarter). Domestic demand grew by 12% year-on-year in the first half of the 
year, with all its components quickening somewhat in Q2. The growth of investment 
(23.8% year-on-year) was particularly notable, owing to the prevalence of very negative 
real interest rates, and to the thrust of private consumption and also of durable goods 
imports from Brazil. Imports climbed by almost 25% that quarter leading, along with the 
notable slowdown in exports, which grew by scarcely 0.5%, to an increase in the negative 
contribution of the external sector, placing it at 3.1 pp (compared with 1.9 pp in Q1). The 
indicators for 2011 Q3 suggest some easing in activity, as do the leading indicators (see 
Chart 12). Unlike in previous years, the trade surplus is narrowing against the background 
of the firmness of the prices of Argentine commodities exports, the slowdown in the Bra-
zilian economy and the strong increase (38%) in imports in the first eight months of the 
year, a situation which might be exacerbated if the fall in the price of soya beans since 
September should persist. Moreover, in 2011 Q2 the current account posted a far lower 
surplus than that attained four quarters earlier, as a result both of the narrowing of the 
trade surplus and of the increase in the deficit on the incomes balance. The financial ac-
count ran a deficit of $2.32 billion in the first half of 2011, compared with the surplus of 
464 million recorded in the same period in 2010, and the formation of net external assets 
SOURCES: National statistics and Bank of Brazil. 
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in the non-financial private sector (an approximate measure of capital outflows) stood at 
$5.4 billion, a similar figure to that in the same period of the previous year. Foreign direct 
investment received by Argentina amounted to only $290 million in 2011 Q2. These trends 
became sharper in Q3, and this, combined with the increase in the volatility of global fi-
nancial markets, led the central bank to sell dollars (the payment of external debt coupled 
with interventions saw reserves decline by $4.5 million from the annual peak in January) 
in order to maintain the peso/dollar rate at a level close to 4.20. As a result of high infla-
tion, the peso has continued to appreciate in real terms. In the fiscal area, government 
revenue grew by 31.7% in the first eight months of the year (including major transfers 
arising from central bank profits), and expenditure by 36.3%, whereby the cumulative 
primary surplus fell by one-third compared with the same period in 2010. Bank lending to 
the private sector has continued to quicken and, in August, its year-on-year growth rate 
was over 50%, although its low level measured in terms of GDP should be borne in mind. 
Also of note is the increase in the dollarisation of deposits that has taken place in the past 
few weeks and the recent rise in the interest rates on these deposits. In the presidential 
elections held on 23 October the current incumbent was re-elected, meaning continuity 
in economic policies is expected.
In Chile, the buoyancy of economic activity held up in a setting of benign financial condi-
tions, a labour market with low unemployment and high growth in wages, and favourable 
terms of trade. The economy thus grew at a year-on-year rate of 6.8% in Q2, with quarter-
on-quarter changes of 1.5% in the first two quarters of the year. Growth continued to be 
led by domestic demand which, however, is showing signs of easing in all its components, 
especially in government consumption and investment. The negative contribution of exter-
nal demand fell to 4.3 pp in Q2 (when it had stood at 12.2 pp in 2010), due especially to 
the slowdown in imports. The data on economic activity in Q3 point to a greater-than-ex-
pected slowdown which is due, in part, to mining strikes. Inflation has stood in recent 
months at around 3%, the central bank target, while medium-term expectations are once 
again within the central bank’s target range, in parallel with the sound performance of core 
inflation. Against this backdrop, the central bank brought the cycle of rises to an end in 
July, following five consecutive monthly increases. Notable on the fiscal side is the low 
level of outturn of public spending in the first half of the year. In June, bank lending to the 
private sector grew by 10% in real terms, with credit to companies and households mov-
ing fairly uniformly.
Activity in Colombia quickened notably in 2011 Q2, with quarter-on-quarter growth of 
2.1%, following the relative sluggishness in Q1. Domestic demand was notably buoyant, 
largely driven by investment, which increased by 14.8%. Conversely, external demand 
detracted 5.5 pp from growth during the quarter, Colombia being the country in the region 
with the highest negative contribution. The indicators of activity point to continuing buoy-
ancy in the economy in Q3, against a propitious labour market background and favourable 
conditions of access to credit. Inflation held within the central bank target range (2%-4%). 
And core inflation stood below 3% in the first half of the year. The central bank kept its 
official interest rate unchanged in August and September, after raising it to 4.5% in the five 
previous meetings. On the fiscal front, legislation was approved for the implementation of 
a structural fiscal rule. Under this rule a structural deficit of 2.5% of GDP is set for 2014, 
which will fall to 1.8% in 2018 and to 1% in 2022. In light of this fiscal discipline, Moody’s 
and Fitch upgraded the sovereign debt rating by a notch to investment grade, thereby fol-
lowing the lead of Standard & Poor’s, who had done likewise in March. The authorities took 
measures to reduce external vulnerability, including the renewal of the flexible credit line 
(FCL) with the IMF.
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In Peru, GDP grew at a year-on-year rate of 6.7% in 2011 Q2, down on the figure of 8.7% 
the previous quarter. There was also a modest slowdown in quarter-on-quarter terms, with 
the respective rates dipping from 1.6% to 1.3%. These developments were marked by the 
low growth of government consumption and investment, influenced by the legal ceilings 
on public spending that are set in the run-up period to elections. In the first half of the year 
the current account ran a deficit of -2.3% of GDP, above that recorded in the same period 
in 2010, mainly due to the widening of the deficit on the incomes account. Inflation moved 
throughout the year on a rising trend (up to 3.7% in September), standing from March 
above the upper limit of the central bank target range (1%-3%). This performance was in 
response, above all, to the deterioration in the non-core inflation segment, which was ex-
acerbated in June by the reduction in petrol price subsidies. The central bank held its of-
ficial rate unchanged at 4.25% from May and, to August, it intervened on the foreign ex-
change market purchasing dollars. However, in late September it made several direct 
dollar sales to withstand the downward pressure on the currency. For the coming months, 
the new government has approved a fiscal stimulus package. Further, the Congress has 
approved the proposed reform of the mining tax regime whereunder royalties will increase 
and the government expects to boost public revenue by an amount close to 0.7% of GDP. 
In a setting in which the new government’s commitment to adopt orthodox economic 
policies is palpable, Standard & Poor’s upgraded Peru’s credit rating from BBB- to BBB, 
one notch above investment grade.
In the first half of 2011 there was an expansion in economic activity in Venezuela of 3.6% 
on average, compared with the 0.1% increase in the second half of 2010. On the supply 
side the relative loss of weight of oil activity has continued, dipping from 20% of GDP to 
close to 12% in the period from 1997 to 2011. In Q2, the re-emergence of the energy crisis 
bore down on activity, leading in June to the announcement of saving measures to reduce 
the country’s high electricity consumption. Bank lending continued to grow at a rate close 
to that of inflation, which held at around 25% in the period under study. Monetary policy 
retained the fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor. The latest anti-inflationary policy 
measure announced by the government was new price-control legislation that enables 
prior control mechanisms to be set in place in the case of companies whose profits are 
considered excessive relative to their costs. In the first half of the year the current account 
surplus increased by more than $8 billion compared with the same period in 2010, running 
a bigger surplus in the first six months of 2011 than the whole of 2010. The improvement 
stemmed chiefly from the increase in the value of oil exports, which accounted for 94.9% 
of the total. Standard & Poor’s downgraded the country’s sovereign debt to B+ from BB- in 
application of their new methodology, which assigns greater importance to political risk. 
Lastly, it was announced in August that Venezuela’s international monetary and gold re-
serves ($9 billion and $19 billion, respectively) will be moved from developed countries’ 
institutions to countries such as Brazil, Russia and China.
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